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Abstract 
Over the last ten years, organisations such as the IMF have launched several initiatives to change market 
practice with respect to sovereign bond contract drafting to ease restructuring after defaults. The first of 
these, the universal adoption of collective action clauses, was embraced by the market after some 
hesitation. Another proposal - the more widespread appointment of trustees to represent bondholders in 
times of crisis, to centralise enforcement action against the debtor and thus to facilitate debt relief - has so 
far failed to have the desired impact. Amongst other potential reasons for this failure, the argument has 
been made that to vest enforcement rights in the trustee, as opposed to individual bondholder rights, 
would be to reduce the deterrence against opportunistic defaults and thus to exacerbate moral hazard. 
Using a sample of secondary market bond spreads and information on default status, this paper assesses 
empirically whether sovereign bonds issued under a trust structure indeed carry a higher default risk. It 
finds no systematic evidence of either a spread premium or higher actual default rates for bonds with 
collective enforcement rights.  
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1 – Introduction 
At the turn of the century, sovereign bond markets were perceived by policy makers and scholars alike to 
be ripe with problems - and little has changed since to warrant a rethinking of that perception. The 
problems revolved around the fact that these markets were ill equipped to deal with sovereign default in 
any satisfactory manner. A series of debt crises during the 1990s showed that sovereign bonds are subject 
to non-payment and rescheduling much like other classes of debt, but that they lack provisions and 
procedures to cope with such situations in an efficient and orderly way. This lack of structure has a 
number of consequences, the most important of which can be summarized under the heading of collective 
action problems.  
Until recently, the majority of sovereign bond contracts - all but those that are governed by the laws 
of England, Japan or Luxembourg - required the unanimous approval of all bondholders if any of their 
payment terms were to be amended. Thus, when a sovereign debtor approached its bond creditors to seek 
a reduction of principal or interest, or a deferral of repayment, this could as a practical matter not be 
achieved within the constraints of the existing bond contracts. The only viable route to debt relief was 
therefore to offer the bondholders new securities with more lenient payment terms in exchange for the 
ones they currently held. Since - leaving aside semi-coercive strategies such as exit consents - 
participation in a bond exchange is voluntary, these exchanges are vulnerable to various types of strategic 
behaviour on the part of bondholders. There is an incentive for some creditors to hold out by rejecting the 
exchange offer and hoping for full repayment under the original terms, thus free-riding on their more 
cooperative peers who, by agreeing to debt relief, help restore the debtor’s ability to pay. As this 
behaviour is widely anticipated, the bondholders’ general preparedness to participate in a proposed 
exchange is reduced, which serves to prolong the crisis. In the absence of a powerful coordination 
mechanism, this discrepancy between what is individually rational and collectively desirable creates 
outcomes that are inferior from the perspective of but a few creditors, and unambiguously harmful to the 
debtor country and third parties.  
To make matters worse, most bonds afford each bondholder the right to largely unconstrained 
individual and independent legal action against a sovereign debtor in case of default. This litigation option 
increases the incentive to hold out and may result in a race to the courthouse, a well-known phenomenon 
in which every creditor attempts to be the first to sue for full repayment at the detriment of all others. 
These collective action problems are aggravated by the lack of collective representation. Bondholders 
usually have no reliable means of communication with each other or with the debtor country, no 
systematic procedure of representation vis à vis the sovereign, for example in restructuring negotiations, 
and no binding rules that would allow them to coordinate their strategies, e.g. to refrain from engaging in 
harmful individual action. For various reasons, bonds are much more prone to these problems than other 
types of sovereign debt, such as bank loans and inter-government debt (Fisch and Gentile, 2004).  
In light of these difficulties and to avoid large output losses in the debtor countries following lengthy 
and agonizing restructuring processes, the international community in many instances felt compelled to 
provide bail-outs. These subsidized loans shift the burden of the crisis from investors to tax payers both in 
the donor countries and in the recipient country. They are therefore an unsatisfactory solution on the 
grounds of equity as well as efficiency because of the resulting moral hazard on the part of the lenders. It 
is against this background that three major proposals for changes in bond drafting practice emerged from 
public sector institutions, in particular the International Monetary Fund (IMF), around the year 2002. 
The most ambitious of these proposals, which later came to be called the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), was initiated by the US Treasury in 2001 and then developed by the 
IMF (Gelpern and Gulati, 2007). The SDRM was known as the statutory approach to sovereign debt 
restructuring because it envisaged a legal framework that would give troubled debtor countries the option 
of subjecting themselves to an international analogy to Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. The 
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proposal was greeted with formidable resistance, in particular from market participants, and in 
consequence was quietly dropped in 2003. Points of criticism included the strong role of the IMF and its 
potential conflict of interest as both a major lender and a facilitator of the process, the enormous political 
efforts required to create the necessary legal framework, and the potential for debtor moral hazard 
because the SDRM was perceived as being soft on borrowers. A number of authors have, however, 
voiced the suspicion that the SDRM was never intended as a viable solution in the first place, but that 
instead its purpose was always that of a threat which was to be carried out in case the market did not 
accept the proposal that was actually favoured by US policy makers (see, for example, Portes, 2003). 
This second proposal called for the universal adoption of collective action clauses (CACs) in 
sovereign bond contracts. CACs break with unanimity by enabling a qualified majority of bondholders, 
typically 75%, to agree with the debtor country on amending the payment terms of the bonds to provide 
debt relief. That amendment then becomes binding also for non-participating bondholders. These 
provisions had already featured in bonds governed by the laws of England, Japan, and Luxembourg, but 
their effectiveness was limited by the fact that almost all countries continued to issue bonds that required 
unanimous consent, such as those governed by the laws of Germany and the state of New York. 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, a growing body of research articles, policy papers and statements by 
academics and officials emphasized the benefits of CACs and called for their inclusion in all new bond 
issues. The calls were eventually1 heard when Mexico made the first publicly noted2 issue with CACs 
under New York law in March 2003. Almost all issues in that jurisdiction have followed Mexico’s 
precedent. German law, however, remains the last stronghold of unanimous consent.3  
Once all outstanding bonds with unanimous consent provisions have matured or have been 
exchanged, CACs promise to effectively put a stop to holdout behaviour – but only after a restructuring 
agreement has been reached. From the moment the debtor has defaulted until the resolution of the crisis – 
a period that may span years – bondholders typically remain unconstrained in exercising their individual 
legal rights. Moreover, once they have exercised those rights, bondholders are not required to share the 
proceeds of litigation with their peers, even though the use of sharing clauses was endorsed repeatedly by 
institutions such as the IMF. CACs in their present form therefore fail to solve collective action problems 
during a crucial stage of the restructuring process. Furthermore, despite several initiatives, recent bond 
issues with CACs have made no progress towards addressing the collective representation problem 
(Drage and Hovaguimian, 2004). This is where the third reform proposal comes in.  
It has long been the custom in US corporate bonds, as well as in a minority of international sovereign 
bonds, to appoint a trustee who will represent the interests of bondholders in their relations with the 
debtor country. Though market practice is not uniform, the trustee typically has powers to monitor the 
debtor’s compliance with the terms of the bonds, to accelerate the debt in the event of default, to initiate 
legal action on behalf of, and instead of, the individual bondholders, and to share the proceeds on a pro 
rata basis. The appointment of a trustee thus constitutes an obvious complement to the use of CACs and a 
feasible and suitable solution to the remaining collective action problems. 
The benefits of channelling bondholder action and communication through a trustee have been stated 
repeatedly for almost 30 years (Smart, 1982; Goodall, 1983; Herbert, 1987; as well as numerous more 
recent publications by the IMF, the Bank of England, and practitioners such as Lee Buchheit). The 
increased use of trustees first appeared on the policy agenda in a report by the G10 Working Group 
(Group of Ten, 1996), and was picked up and reiterated by the IMF staff (IMF, 2002, 2003), amongst 
others. Meanwhile, as will be shown in more detail below, new bond issues have not relied on trust 
structures to the extent that their proponents would like to see.  
                                                   
1
 For potential reasons for the delayed market reaction, see Gelpern and Gulati (2007) and Häseler (2009). 
2
 Gugiatti and Richards (2004) and Gelpern and Gulati (2008) document a number of sovereign bond contracts from before 2003 
that include CACs despite being governed by New York law. 
3
 To erase the doubts about the admissibility of CACs under German law (Häseler, 2009), a reform of the Schuldverschreibungs-
gesetz (indenture law) was enacted on August 5th, 2009. Whether or not there will be any impact on market practice is difficult to 
say because only a single bond has been issued under German law since 2004, according to the dataset used in this study.   
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Häseler (2008) discusses several potential reasons for this lack of progress. Among them is the 
perception that bondholders’ individual enforcement rights provide an essential deterrent against 
opportunistic sovereign defaults, and that the reallocation of enforcement rights to a trustee would in 
consequence destroy this deterrent and thus cause a deterioration of market discipline. This view has been 
expressed both by academics (Fisch and Gentile, 2004; Bedford, 2005) and by practitioners (Chamberlin, 
2002).4 While Häseler (2008) examines the market reaction over time to an event that reveals investor’s 
attitudes towards collective enforcement rights more generally, this paper focuses specifically on the 
question as to whether bonds with collective enforcement rights – those governed by trust structures – are 
perceived as being in greater risk of default. This question is addressed for the first time through a number 
of tests based on a cross-section of international sovereign bonds. Using the literature on borrowing costs 
effects of collective action clauses as a starting point, this paper applies that literature’s methodology to 
trustees and expands on it by presenting additional empirical approaches. While Fisch and Gentile (2004) 
propose a similar research agenda, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first implementation.  
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section sets out more clearly the implications for 
enforcement rights of trust structures as compared to their alternative, fiscal agency agreements. Section 3 
describes the dataset and presents some descriptive statistics on sovereign bond issuing practice which 
supplement the earlier literature on collective action clauses and trustees. Section 4 is dedicated to the 
empirical methodology and results. Section 5 concludes.  
2 – Trustees versus Fiscal Agents 
Governance Structure and Enforcement Rights 
This section introduces the term 'governance structure' to denote the way a sovereign debtor's relations 
with its creditors are organised. The governance structure of a bond can take three forms - trust deed, trust 
indenture, or fiscal agency agreement only - and determines certain aspects of the communication 
between debtor and bondholders, the representation of bondholders, and the set of rights that bondholders 
enjoy, either individually or collectively, in dealing with the debtor country. We will show that the three 
governance structures provide a menu of choice between the extremes of individual and collective action, 
the latter having important advantages both during a crisis and in times of normal debt service. The 
exposition will be brief since the differences between trust structures and fiscal agency agreements have 
been covered in depth elsewhere.5 
Most sovereign bonds are subject to a fiscal agency agreement. When issuing the bond, the debtor 
appoints a fiscal agent, typically a bank, to perform a set of largely administrative functions, in particular 
to receive payments of interest and principal from the debtor for distribution to the creditors, but also to 
distribute and register the bonds themselves and to relay information from the debtor country to the 
bondholders. The fiscal agent serves solely the issuer and bears no obligation towards the bondholders, 
except that all monies received from the debtor are held in trust for them. Importantly, under a fiscal 
agency agreement each bondholder retains the right to contractual remedies in the event of a default. This 
includes the right to accelerate their claims under certain conditions, such as a missed interest payment, 
and to initiate legal proceedings against the debtor. In some cases, however, acceleration requires a vote 
by the holders of a certain proportion of the principal. 
                                                   
4
 In correspondence with the author, Michael Chamberlin, Executive Director of the Emerging Markets Traders Association, said, 
"My personal view is that market discipline and individual rights of action are important protections for investors." 
5
 See, for example, Horn (1972), Smart (1982), Goodall (1983), Pergam (1985b,c), Herbert (1987), Buchheit and Gulati (2002), 
Häseler (2008, 2009). 
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Instead of, or in addition to, the fiscal agent, the issuer may appoint a trustee to represent and protect 
the interests of the bondholders.6 The trustee will take over most enforcement powers from the individual 
bondholders, the details depending on whether the trust is created under English law (trust deed) or US 
law (trust indenture). The trust concept is not recognised or used in most other jurisdictions.  
The English-style trust deed is a contract between the issuer and the trustee which specifies the 
extensive ways in which the trustee is obliged to serve the interests of the bondholders. The trustee has 
both the power and the duty to monitor the debtor’s compliance with the terms of the instrument, and to 
take remedial measures in case the debtor fails to meet its contractual obligations. The trustee may act 
either on its own initiative or when instructed to do so by the required proportion of bondholders. The 
right to accelerate the debt and to initiate legal proceedings against the debtor rests exclusively with the 
trustee, rather than with the individual bondholders, and the proceeds from litigation will be shared 
among the bondholders on a pro rata basis. An exception lies in the case where the trustee fails to take 
action despite being prompted to do so by a certain percentage of bondholders. Only then will the 
individual bondholders redeem the right to accelerate and enforce their own claims as they would under a 
fiscal agency agreement.  
New York-style trust indentures generally follow the requirements of the US Trust Indenture Act of 
1939, even though the act applies only to corporate bonds. The Act stipulates that “each bondholder has 
an unqualified right to bring an individual enforcement action to recover her share of any amounts of 
principal and interest not paid on their respective due dates. Apart from this individual right to recover 
overdue amounts, however, only the trustee has the right to pursue other remedies, including the 
important right to sue for accelerated amounts” (Buchheit and Gulati, 2002, pp. 15). Unlike the trust deed, 
the trust indenture does not imply a sharing requirement. Thus, trust indentures constitute a middle 
ground in terms of enforcement rights between the extremes of fiscal agency agreements and trust deeds.  
Despite the differences, trust structures of either description share a set of advantages over fiscal 
agency agreements. Herbert (1987) stresses the greater flexibility of trustees in dealing with changing 
circumstances. The trustee may consent to minor changes in the debt instrument and even waive breaches 
of the contract terms, which might otherwise trigger acceleration or legal action, as long as the interests of 
the bondholders are not ‘materially prejudiced’. Pergam (1985c) highlights the trustee’s ability to call a 
meeting of bondholders, something which the fiscal agent cannot typically do. Not least in this sense, 
trust structures complement collective action clauses. According to Goodall (1983), an additional benefit 
lies in the fact that all funds received by the trustee from the debtor are held in trust for the bondholders, 
whereas funds held by a fiscal agent for the same purpose can be used to settle any debts of the issuer.  
Arguably the greatest advantage, however, is the trustee’s ability to restrain individual bondholder 
action. And it is here where, according to Buchheit and Karpinski (2006, p. 230), US-style trust 
indentures fall dramatically short of their English counterparts: “[I]f individual holders are free to bring 
their own lawsuits to recover their share of missed payments, then a Hobbesian state of nature is created 
among the bondholders.” Only a trust structure according to the English pattern can completely eliminate 
the well-documented risk of a ‘race to the courthouse’ where bondholders use whatever individual 
enforcement rights they possess to satisfy their claims while the efficient approach to crisis resolution 
clearly demands coordination both among the bondholders as well as with the debtor country. By 
suppressing selfish and premature individual enforcement of the bonds, trust deeds provide greater 
protection both for investors, but also for the issuer, who will be spared a multiplicity of actions.  
These benefits of bond enforcement through a trustee naturally refer to a trustee who does not 
hesitate to make use of the powers vested in him, and whose powers are properly specified in the first 
place. Buchheit and Gulati (2009) point out the tendency of bond drafters to dilute the standard of care 
that the trustee must exercise in representing the bondholders and the dire consequences for debt 
enforcement.  
                                                   
6
 See Horn (1972) and Herbert (1987) on the nomenclature of, and interaction between, fiscal agent and trustee when both are 
present in a sovereign bond issue. 
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The added services of a trustee naturally come at a cost, which is borne by the issuer. Yet, at “a few 
thousand dollars a year” (Lee Buchheit) or “a basis point or two” (Smart, 1982, p. 18), the difference 
relative to a fiscal agent is rather moderate. For borrowers who are most unlikely ever to default, all that 
needs to be done is to distribute payments of interest and principal, and that is achieved more cheaply by a 
fiscal agent (Smart, 1982; Goodall, 1983). As soon as default becomes a real possibility, however, most 
scholars would agree that a country is well advised to issue new bonds under a trust structure, and in 
particular one with collective enforcement rights only. And in fact there are signs that market practice 
may begin to move in that direction. Following the advice of Lee Buchheit on behalf of Cleary Gottlieb 
Steen & Hamilton LLP, “Grenada (in 2005) and Belize (in 2007) have issued New York-law bonds under 
US-style trust indentures that lodge all enforcement powers in the trustee, similar to an English trust deed. 
This represents a significant convergence of English trust deed and US trust indenture documentation 
practices” (Buchheit, 2007, p. 2). The Republic of Congo also issued bonds under a trust indenture but 
with full collective enforcement rights in December 2007.  
Deterrence 
As noted before, it has been argued that bondholders’ individual enforcement rights provide an essential 
check on the borrowers’ inherent ability to discontinue debt service as they see fit. An English-style trust 
deed, by contrast, is the governance structure which is perceived as being the least likely to produce 
creditor litigation. The trustee may elect not to react upon a breach of the bond contract, and several 
authors have in fact noted a certain tendency for trustees to move against the debtor only when obliged to 
do so.7 A trustee is also much easier for the debtor country to deal with in the case of default, making the 
prospect of creditor reaction to default yet more bearable, as compared to individual creditor rights. In 
section four, this paper thus tests the hypothesis of a systematic relationship between governance structure 
and default. According to the hypothesis, trustees, and in particular those of the English variety, are not as 
effective as individual bondholder action in deterring default.  
This deterrence view of enforcement rights is open to scepticism. It appears to rest on a set of specific 
assumptions about the debtor’s motives to default (Häseler, 2008). First, deterrence can play a role only if 
the debtor has some discretion over the continuation of debt service. If most defaults arise out of genuine 
distress, then there little scope for deterrence, except perhaps in the policies that lead up to the distress.8 
Second, even if the debtor has a choice, the hazard of creditor litigation is only one of many looming 
costs of default, which also include loss of reputation and consequently higher borrowing costs, negative 
effects on economic growth, political or trade sanctions, and so on. Third, debtors often default on several 
classes of debt at once (Pergam, 1985a), which further reduces the importance of the threat of legal action 
from one particular class of creditors.  
Moreover, assuming for the sake of the argument that the prospect of bondholder action does tend to 
deter defaults, it is by no means clear that a regime of individual enforcement rights will give rise to more 
of such action. Given returns to scale and externalities in litigation, it may well be that a trustee will 
initiate legal proceedings when no individual bondholder would. This is because for smaller claims the 
costs of going to court will outweigh the potential gains and because the costs of legal action under a 
fiscal agency agreement are purely private whereas the benefits in terms of disciplining the debtor are 
partly public in nature.9 Evidently, theoretical considerations on the deterrence effect of individual 
enforcement rights are inconclusive, which is why we turn to empirical data in the next two sections. 
                                                   
7
 As Michael Chamberlin said in correspondence with the author: “Trustees are notable for their caution, occasional incompe-
tence and being subject to institutional constraints (need indemnities, may have conflicts of interest or be subject to political 
suasion) that make them less effective as litigants than individual holders.” See also Goodall (1983, p. 2): “[I]nvestors often 
complain that trustees do not act positively enough.” Buchheit and Gulati (2009) document the case of a “bovinely passive 
trustee” who failed to safeguard creditor rights in Ecuador’s recent default in 2008.  
8
 Buchheit and Gulati (2009) provide an account of Ecuador’s said default, which was clearly not of the distress type.  
9
 These arguments are developed more fully in Häseler (2008). 
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3 – Data 
Sources 
The basis of this study is the universe of international10 sovereign bonds whose information was available 
for download from the Bloomberg11 database on March 5th, 2009, including matured and recalled bonds. 
In contrast to most of the existing literature, the data is not restricted to emerging market economies. The 
advantage of including the whole range of credit ratings is - besides the greater sample size - that the 
resulting increase in variation in some of the variables will produce better estimates. 
Figure 1 shows the rating composition of a typical sample used in the regressions below. While, 
relative to earlier studies,12 the rating range is extended on the left by about one third, less than 15% of the 
bonds in the sample fall in that part of the spectrum. 
 
 
 
The download encompasses a total of 3941 bond issues; however, depending on the subject of analysis, 
only a few hundred bonds feature all the required information. The download information was 
supplemented with details from the prospectuses, where available, in order to increase the sample size for 
bonds with rare characteristics, in particular defaulted bonds that were issued under trust deeds. A sample 
of the data comprising 20 bonds was checked for accuracy with respect to governance structure by 
comparing the downloaded information with the prospectuses. No deviations were found. Issue sizes were 
converted into dollar amounts using exchange rates from www.oanda.com. Relying primarily on Standard 
and Poor’s figures, ratings were converted to a numerical scale, where a high value corresponds to high 
default risk. Blanks were filled with the help of Moody’s ratings or on the basis of the fact that all bond 
issues by a particular country almost always receive the same rating.  
                                                   
10
 Bloomberg’s definition of “international” refers to the bonds that are issued on non-domestic markets. For the purpose of this 
study and throughout the literature, “international” means that the bonds are governed by laws other than those of the issuing 
country. Adjustments were made to account for the difference in definitions.  
11
 Besides Bondware, Bloomberg is the standard source of bond information in the literature. Becker et al (2001) and Gugiatti 
and Richards (2003) obtain details such as governing law and ratings from Bloomberg. All data is available upon request. 
12
 For example, Becker et al (2001) use only bonds from countries rated A1/A+ or below. 
Figure 1: Rating composition of a typical sample 
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Before turning to the analysis proper, some descriptive statistics will be derived from this sample to 
expand on the figures that are available in the earlier literature on governance structure and collective 
action clauses, respectively.  
Governance Structure 
The literature contains fairly detailed figures on the use of collective action clauses both over time (e.g., 
Bradley et al, 2008) and across jurisdictions (IMF, 2003). Comparable figures on governance structure 
are, however, difficult to find. Any information provided is usually of a rather vague nature, such as “trust 
structures are common under English law”. The dataset collected for this study provides a good 
opportunity to close that gap. It must be noted, though, that the statistics below cover only about 40% of 
all bond issues during the respective period due to the limited availability of information, in particular 
with respect to governance structure and governing law.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the number of bond issues per quarter over the last eight years and the associated 
governance structures. “no_T” refers to bonds that were issued under fiscal agency agreements only; 
“T_NY” means trustee and New York governing law; “T_E” means English-style trust deed; “T_?” 
means trust structure but unknown governing law. Two things should be noted at this point. First, 
throughout the analysis, a bond that is labelled as having a trust structure may or may not also have a 
fiscal agent. It is the presence of a trustee, rather than the fiscal agent, that determines the nature of 
enforcement rights. Second, a number of bonds are listed as T_E even though they are in fact governed by 
the laws of New York. This applies to two bonds issued by each of Belize and the Congo, and three bonds 
issued by Grenada, all of which concentrate enforcement rights in the trustee to the same extent as they 
would under English law, as mentioned in section two.13  
The chart shows that in all but three quarters, the majority of bond issues feature no trustee. Among 
those that do have collective representation, trust indentures are far more common than trust deeds. This 
is not to say that issuers dislike the stronger version of collective enforcement rights in trust deeds; it may 
                                                   
13
 If the markets care about such subtle differences in contract terms, they will be aware of them, given the coverage in trade 
publications (Buchheit, 2007). The impact of this re-coding on the subsequent regressions is, however, negligible because at most 
two of such bonds carry sufficient information to be included in any given regression.  
Figure 2: Number of bond issues per quarter with and without trustees 
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simply reflect the fact that New York is the more popular choice for governing law. In fact, the proportion 
of bonds that is issued under a trust structure is quite similar in the two jurisdictions: 24% in England 
versus 28% in New York.14 This finding is at odds with an impression that is sometimes conveyed in the 
literature, according to which trustees are more popular in England than in the US where there is a 
stronger emphasis on individualism.  
Trustees were not used in any other jurisdiction in this dataset, except for one notable exception: 
Morgan Stanley Bank AG acted as trustee for a Zloty-denominated bond that was issued under German 
law by the Federal Republic of Austria on June 11th, 1997, even though trust structures are generally 
thought not to be recognised by civil law jurisdictions.15 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 more clearly shows the development of trustee usage (under either governing law) over time. 
The breakup by volume and by number of issues is almost identical because bonds with and without 
trustees differ in issue size by no more than 5% on average. The graph suggests a slight upward trend. 
However, variability over time remains high. Thus, the data are in accordance with Buchheit’s (2007, 
p. 2) statement that there “has been a noticeable shift toward the use of trust structures in sovereign bond 
issuances over the last few years.” Alas, trustees remain far from becoming the market standard.  
The data also allow us to probe the question as to what kinds of countries issue under trustees. The 
previous section offered some thoughts on costs and benefits of trust structures in relation to default risk, 
and suggested that trustees are particularly advisable for low-rated borrowers. The data in fact confirm the 
theoretical considerations.  
Table 1 shows summary statistics for all bonds whose governance structure (trustee / no trustee) is 
known. Standard & Poor’s ratings were converted to numerical values, where large numbers refer to 
higher default risk. Bonds with trustees are associated with a higher default risk than those without. The 
difference in sample means is significant at standard confidence levels. 
                                                   
14
 This refers to all bonds issued between 2000 and 2008 whose governance structure could be ascertained.  
15
 See, for example, Liu (2002) or Group of Ten (2002). According to Horn (1972), trustees do exist under German law, but their 
functions are much more limited than under English or New York law.   
Figure 3: Percentage of bonds that were issued under a trust structure 
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no Trustee Trustee 
No. of Bonds 298 59 
Mean Rating 9.81 11 
Variance 13.69 12.45 
t-test statistic 2.348 
 
 
 
Statistical association of course has nothing to say about causation and in particular about the direction of 
causation. As with collective action clauses or governing law (Becker et al, 2001), there is no indication 
that rating agencies consider the presence of a trust structure as a risk factor in a bond. Thus, if there is 
causation, it must run from a country’s credit quality to its choice of governance structure.  
Collective Action Clauses 
Though collective action clauses are not the primary subject of this article, the present dataset provides a 
valuable opportunity to check some of the stylised facts that appear to be widely accepted in the literature. 
Two bond characteristics are of interest here, use or non-use of CACs (as reported by Bloomberg), and 
governing law. These two pieces of information are available for a sample of 483 bonds, with issuing 
dates going back to 1983. The split in terms of governing law is 1:7:9:137:329 bonds under French, 
Japanese, German, English, and New York law, respectively. Relative to figures reported elsewhere, the 
absence of Luxembourg law is notable, as is the marked predominance of New York law. Unsurprisingly, 
none of the small number of German law bonds feature CACs.  
According to the stylised facts, both English and Japanese bonds contain CACs, while bonds that are 
governed by the laws of New York did not contain CACs prior to 2003. These statements are sometimes 
modified through the use of words such as “traditionally”, “usually” or “typically”, or through reference 
to “the market standard”.16 The first half of the empirical literature on CACs17 relied on these “facts” 
almost unquestioningly, inasmuch as governing law was used as a proxy for the presence of CACs, whose 
actual use or non-use was much more difficult to ascertain. The present data indicate that this reliance was 
unwarranted, and even more so than has been stated previously.18 
First, none – rather than all – of the Japanese law bonds in the sample contain CACs. This 
observation is diametrically opposed to common wisdom. Even though at seven, the number of bonds is 
very small, and even though we have information on only about 10% of all bonds in the dataset, the 
complete absence of CACs in these few bonds creates at least some discomfort with the view that “all” or 
“most” Japanese law bonds contain CACs. 
Second, the use of CACs is the standard under English law to a far lesser extent than many 
publications would have the reader believe. Figure 4 below shows that in most years since 2000, the 
majority of English law bonds did not contain the clauses. In fact, only about 28% of all bonds on which 
information is available allow for collective action. This is nowhere near “the market standard”. And 
since the number of bonds which this observation is based on is much larger than with respect to the 
Japanese law bonds, it is possible to say with some confidence that the common perception about issuing 
practice under English law needs to be revised.  
                                                   
16
 Virtually all publications on collective action clauses contain global statements such as these, for example Liu (2002), IMF 
(2002, 2003), and Gugiatti and Richards (2003). 
17
 This includes the papers by Tsatsaronis (1999), Eichengreen and Mody (2000), and Becker, Richards, and Thaicharoen (2001). 
18
 Gugiatti and Richards (2004) and Häseler (2009) remark that the correlation between governing law and CACs is less than 
perfect.  
Table 1: Average rating of bonds issued with and without trustees 
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Third and last, collective action clauses were more prevalent under New York law before 2003 than 
is commonly thought. Several authors have already documented that Mexico’s issue in March of that year 
was not the first to make use of the clauses in that jurisdiction. Liu (2002, p. 7) mentions “at least one 
case” of majority restructuring provisions under New York law. Gugiatti and Richards (2004, p. 6) 
identify “five emerging market sovereign issuers [Bulgaria, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Lebanon and Qatar] that 
have issued bonds into the international market under New York governing law but which nonetheless 
include CACs.” The authors estimate the total face value of such bonds to be around $11.9 billion. 
Finally, Gelpern and Gulati (2008, p. 5) mention “examples of CACs in New York law paper going back 
to 1983” but unfortunately do not provide any clues as to the identity of these securities.  
 
  
 
 
The Bloomberg data reveal a picture that is even more strongly at odds with the stylised facts. As shown 
in figure 4, already in 2001 more than half of all issues under New York law contained CACs. In total, 21 
countries issued 67 bonds with CACs despite being governed by New York law before March 2003. The 
overall issue size amounts to more than $95bn – eight times the amount found by Gugiatti and Richards 
(2004). Such issues have occurred regularly from 1996 onwards, but also before: Italy in 1993 and New 
Zealand in 1986. The difference to the existing literature cannot be explained solely by the fact that this 
sample includes issues by all countries, rather than merely emerging markets, because these figures 
include only five bonds by two non-emerging market issuers, totalling a mere $8bn in face value.  
The implications of these findings are twofold. Firstly, general statements about the use of CACs in 
certain jurisdictions are hardly tenable. Secondly, yet more weight should be given to the criticism of the 
early empirical literature on CACs (1999 to 2001), which equated governing law with the use or non-use 
of CACs. Given the above evidence on ‘irregularities’ under Japanese, English, and New York law, it 
seems likely that those early studies misclassified more than 20%, but perhaps up to one third, of all 
bonds in their samples. In light of the often shaky coefficient estimates, coding errors of such magnitude 
can tip the results either way in an unpredictable manner.  
Figure 4: Number of bonds issued by governing law and presence of CACs 
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4 – Methodology and Results 
This section presents two alternative approaches to assessing any potential deterrence effect of individual 
enforcement rights. First, we extend the methodology of the literature on collective action clauses to test 
for secondary market spread differentials between bonds issued under trust structures versus fiscal agency 
agreements. Subsequently, we depart from previous research by testing directly for an effect of 
governance structure on the incidence of defaults. 
Spread Differentials 
There was at the beginning of the millennium a controversy as to whether the presence of collective 
action clauses in a sovereign bond is associated with higher spreads, i.e. higher borrowing costs. If it 
were, it would be very difficult to persuade sovereigns to include the clauses in new bond issues. It took a 
sizable body of research to convince the market, as well as academia and the public sector, that CACs do 
not give rise to higher spreads.19 Such evidence does not yet exist with respect to governance structure. To 
show whether the appointment of a trustee increases borrowing costs may help the reform efforts to 
increase the use of collective enforcement structures.  
Spread differentials are also a good approximation of our true variable of interest, default risk. While 
spreads also reflect other factors, such as liquidity and exchange rate risks, default risk is by far the most 
important component. A more direct test of default risk follows towards the end of the section.  
We proceed as follows. The dependent variable consists of the difference in basis points between a 
bond’s yield-to-maturity and the yield on a matching risk-free bond of the same currency and comparable 
maturity. Logs are taken in accordance with standard practice in the literature. The independent variables 
of interest relate to governance structure. The presence of a trustee under English and US law, 
respectively, is assigned a dummy variable each; fiscal agency agreements constitute the omitted 
category. The dummies are constructed from the information that is available in the Bloomberg database: 
the governing law of a bond and the name of the trustee or fiscal agent. Bonds that were reported as 
having a trustee were coded as such, regardless of whether or not a fiscal agent was also mentioned, for 
the reasons given above. In parts of the analysis, the distinction between English and US-style trustee is 
dropped to preserve a sufficiently large number of bonds with a given set of characteristics.  
The trustee dummies were added to the regression only once a baseline model with a reasonably 
good fit was found so as to resist the temptation of adding controls according to their effect on the 
coefficients of interest. When control variables are added, the availability of information limits the sample 
size to around 300 observations. Again as before, some observations were adjusted to reflect the full 
collective enforcement rights in a number of Buchheit-advised New York law bonds, i.e. they were coded 
as being governed by an English trust deed. The peculiar Austrian law bond mentioned previously was 
omitted, as were a few bonds with negative spreads.  
As for the control variables, credit rating has by far the greatest explanatory power. Further controls 
which were used in some but not all specifications include the bid-ask-spread as a proxy of liquidity, total 
duration, remaining time to maturity, dollar amount outstanding, and sets of dummies for the market of 
issue, maturity type, the presence of options, and the use of collective action clauses. Finally, this 
particular dataset necessitates an additional dummy variable, which we term MINOR_CURRENCY. A 
few bonds are issued in currencies whose home countries are associated with considerable default risk. In 
those cases, Bloomberg’s measure of spreads is distorted; it does not reflect the risk of that particular 
bond but rather the difference to some other risky asset. For example, a bond issued by the Federal 
Republic of Austria in Turkish lira is much less likely to be in default than the benchmark bond by the 
                                                   
19
 The most important contributions to that literature are discussed in Häseler (2009).  
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Turkish government, which results in a spread that is biased downwards. The dummy variable 
MINOR_CURRENCY captures this handful of cases.20  
Baseline regressions 
The first set of regressions is done in simple log-linear ordinary least squares, without regard to any 
potential issues of endogeneity. Except for the omissions mentioned above, the sample includes all bonds 
that feature the required information and that were not in default at the time of download.21 The resulting 
sample size is 355 bonds.  
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(SPREAD)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CONSTANT 4.375*** (0.125) 
4.365*** 
(0.129) 
4.365*** 
(0.125) 
4.357*** 
(0.165) 
BID_ASK_SPREAD 0.222** (0.071) 
0.212** 
(0.071) 
0.199** 
(0.073) 
0.186** 
(0.076) 
RATING 0.237*** (0.028) 
0.236*** 
(0.028) 
0.238*** 
(0.028) 
0.232*** 
(0.036) 
RATING^2 -0.005*** (0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
MINOR_CURRENCY -3.059*** (0.207) 
-3.069*** 
(0.206) 
-3.077*** 
(0.207) 
-3.085*** 
(0.206) 
GLOBAL -0.248*** (0.056) 
-0.245*** 
(0.056) 
-0.242*** 
(0.056) 
-0.189*** 
(0.062) 
CALL 0.223*** (0.138) 
0.213 
(0.138) 
0.198 
(0.139) 
0.25* 
(0.149) 
REPO -0.11* (0.061) 
-0.101* 
(0.061) 
-0.101* 
(0.061) 
-0.151** 
(0.067) 
TRUSTEE  0.118* (0.069) 
 0.16** 
(0.073) 
TRUSTEE_ENGLISH   0.24 (0.157) 
 
TRUSTEE_NEW_YORK   0.095 (0.074) 
 
CACS    -0.092 (0.063) 
Observations 355 355 355 308 
adj. R^2 0.676 0.678 0.678 0.688 
10%-level (*), 5%-level (**) and 1%-level (***) level of significance, two-tailed test. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 2 summarises the results of some baseline regressions for spreads. Model 1 includes all control 
variables whose coefficients are statistically significant at standard confidence levels. GLOBAL, CALL, 
                                                   
20
 Becker et al (2001) omit such ‘exotic’ bonds from the sample. It is probably best to include them as long as their particularities 
can be reasonably well modelled.  
21
 The spread on a bond in default, tautologically, does not reflect default risk. Such bonds are therefore excluded from this part 
of the analysis.  
Table 2: Baseline OLS regressions for spreads  
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and REPO are dummy variables for bonds that were marketed globally, have call options attached to 
them, or have been partly redeemed by the issuer, respectively. The model is able to explain almost 70 per 
cent of the variation in spreads. The coefficients are fairly robust to the inclusion of additional controls 
and to specification changes. Model 2 then introduces a dummy variable for the presence of a trustee 
under either governing law. While the incumbent coefficient estimates are hardly affected, it appears that 
bonds with trustees carry somewhat higher spreads than those with fiscal agency agreements only, though 
the difference is barely significant. The point estimate would suggest that bonds which are subject to trust 
arrangements trade at an eleven per cent spread premium. For a country with an average credit rating like 
Brazil, this would imply a spread premium for bonds with trustees of 10 to 15 basis points. However, the 
results cannot be relied upon given the large standard error. Through the inclusion of a dummy variable 
for governing laws under which trustees may be used (only English and New York law in this sample), it 
can be shown that the trustee effect is not simply attributable to governing law since the coefficient on 
that dummy is insignificant whereas the coefficient on trustees remains largely unchanged.  
In model 3, a distinction is made between trustees under English versus New York law. Again, none 
of the other variables are materially affected, and neither of the trustee coefficients is anywhere near 
statistical significance. Interestingly though, the results suggest that the spread premium is larger for 
English law trustees than for their American counterparts. This is what one would expect if it were true 
that trust structures entail a higher default risk because of the reduced threat of disciplining litigation. 
According to that view, American trust indentures are the lesser of two evils.  
Finally, in model 4 a further dummy variable for the presence of collective action clauses is 
introduced. Due to the limited availability of information, the sample is now restricted to 308 bonds. Even 
in this subsample, the coefficients on the controls remain virtually the same, which speaks once more for 
the robustness of this set of regressions. The coefficient on collective action clauses is negative but the 
standard error is too large to rely on the estimate, which would suggest a reduction of spreads by less than 
10 basis points. The coefficient on trustees (of either description), however, turns significant at the 5%-
level in this specification. 
As a final exercise with this set of regressions, the dependent variable was modified somewhat so as 
to make it more amenable to the default risk interpretation which was originally intended. If, besides 
default risk, spreads reflect liquidity and a number of other less important factors, then stripping them of 
the liquidity component will give greater weight to default risk in the variable that results from this 
transformation. In practical terms, spreads were regressed on the bid-ask-spread as the commonly 
accepted proxy for liquidity, raised to the first, second and third power. The residuals from this auxiliary 
regression then become the new dependent variable to replace the log of spreads in the baseline 
regressions. At least with respect to the trustee coefficients, the results are almost identical to those 
obtained previously and are therefore not reported.  
Sample selectivity 
Due to missing information, in most of the regressions throughout this study the sample size amounts to 
less than 10% of the bonds that were downloaded, which may in term constitute but a sample of the 
universe of international sovereign bonds. There is thus a possibility that the estimated relationships are 
not representative of the wider population of bonds; in other words, they could be biased.  
The unavailability of information, and thus the selection of the samples, is presumably non-random. 
Yet, such non-randomness by itself need not cause bias. There would have to be some factor, call it X, 
that is on the one hand correlated with the availability of information and, on the other hand, with the 
relationships under investigation, i.e. with the effect of governance structure on default risk. X would 
have to exhibit both of these properties to create a potential for bias. The former of these is not easily 
tested; the latter, by contrast, is. We simply add to the baseline regressions interaction terms involving 
governance structure and all plausible candidates for X to check whether the impact of governance 
structure changes as X varies. The availability of information might conceivably be correlated with rating, 
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issue size, global issues, private placements, or duration. The results indicate that none of these variables 
interact significantly with governance structure or with the presence of collective action clauses.  
This is the econometric approach to addressing selectivity concerns; however, there is also a practical 
approach. Conversations with Bloomberg staff revealed that the availability of information depends 
primarily on whether Bloomberg is in possession of the bond documentation, in particular the prospectus. 
This in turn depends on circumstances which are utterly unrelated to the moral hazard effects of collective 
enforcement. On practical as well as on empirical grounds, we may therefore conclude with some 
confidence that the danger of sample selection bias is quite limited.  
Fixed effects regressions 
So far, the econometric sophistication of the analysis is at the level of Tsatsaronis (1999), the first 
systematic empirical study on collective action clauses. Eichengreen and Mody (2000) then drew 
attention to the issue of endogeneity, which therefore every subsequent study had to address in some way 
or other. The authors fail to explain the problem in any detail, but the reasoning goes along the following 
lines: The presence of collective action clauses, as proxied by the choice of governing law, is endogenous 
to the model because issuers plausibly make a conscious choice regarding the clauses, based on their own 
creditworthiness. Consequently, there is the potential for two-way causation between spreads and the 
variable of interest. The very same considerations apply to the present analysis, given the good reasons 
for issuers to choose the governance structure according to their credit rating, as discussed above. 
Eichengreen and Mody’s response to endogeneity concerns is to run an instrumental variables 
approach. In a first step, the choice of governing law is modelled, and the predicted values of that 
regression are then plugged into the spread equation instead of the true values. This approach was heavily 
criticised by Becker et al (2001) on several grounds. The authors argue that endogeneity is not that serious 
a problem and is therefore perhaps best left uncured. If any correction for endogeneity is to be made, then 
the instrumental variables approach is not the best choice because it tends to inflate the parameter 
estimates. Becker et al instead favour fixed effects estimation.  
The idea behind this solution is to introduce fixed effects at the country level by assigning a dummy 
variable to each (but one) issuer. Thus, any influences on spreads that are specific to the issuer are held 
constant so that the focus can be placed on spread differentials between bonds with and without a certain 
trait for a given set of issuer characteristics. Fixed effects is also the preferred method in our analysis 
because the instrumental variables approach is costly in terms of data requirements and yet crude unless a 
very good instrument can be found. Fixed effects implies excluding countries that have persistently issued 
either with or without trustees. In the present dataset, we are then left with 22 countries with a total of 236 
bonds. A distinction between trustees under English and New York law can no longer be made as the 
number of relevant bonds is too small (9 and 44 bonds, respectively). Table 3 below shows the results.  
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Dependent Variable: LOG(SPREAD)  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CONSTANT 7.96*** (0.21) 7.999*** (0.204) 8.039*** (0.209) 
MINOR_CURRENCY -0.995** (0.471) -1.001** (0.48) -1.007** (0.475) 
MINOR_CURRENCY* 
BID_ASK_SPREAD -0.76*** (0.287) -0.744*** (0.286) -0.77*** (0.29) 
GLOBAL 0.094* (0.049) 0.1** (0.049) 0.219*** (0.043) 
SINKABLE -0.288*** (0.1) -0.279*** (0.1) -0.295** (0.127) 
DURATION -0.019** (0.008) -0.02** (0.008) -0.026*** (0.01) 
TIME_TO_MATURITY 0.025*** (0.008) 0.026*** (0.008) 0.032*** (0.01) 
TRUSTEE 
 
-0.067 (0.048) 0.002 (0.043) 
CACS 
  
-0.104** (0.047) 
Obs. 236 236 204 
Adj. R^2 0.88 0.881 0.886 
10%-level (*), 5%-level (**) and 1%-level (***) level of significance, two-tailed test. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors in parentheses. 21 country dummies are not reported. 
 
 
 
The 21 country dummy variables are all strongly significant, individually as well as jointly, but are not 
reported here. A regression on the dummies alone is able to explain more than 76% of the variation in the 
log of spreads. Model 1 adds a number of control variables to yield a very high adjusted R2 of 0.88. The 
set of controls differs somewhat from the baseline regressions. The duration of a bond, time to maturity, 
and a dummy for sinkable bonds now add significantly to the explanatory power of the model. The rating 
variable is no longer useful because bonds from a given country almost always carry the same rating. 
Trustees are introduced in model 2. As opposed to the baseline regressions, the coefficient is negative 
though far from significant. When collective action clauses are introduced as a further control variable in 
model 3, the trustee dummy coefficient becomes indistinguishable from zero. CACs are estimated to have 
a significant negative impact on spreads (around ten basis points for a country like Brazil), and the 
coefficient is similar in size to the estimate without fixed effects. Again as a final exercise, the dependent 
variable was stripped of any influence of liquidity as proxied by bid-ask-spreads to move the 
interpretation of the spreads away from borrowing costs and towards default risk. As before, this 
transformation has hardly any impact on the estimates and the results are therefore not reported.  
Incidence of Default 
Above we have noted the limits of interpreting spread differentials for the purpose of this study. A much 
more intuitively appealing way of testing for a deterrence effect of individual enforcement rights is to 
check whether the likelihood of a bond being in default depends on its governance structure.22 
Surprisingly enough, this simple approach was never used in the parallel literature on collective action 
clauses even though that literature sought to answer very similar questions.  
                                                   
22
 Thanks to Daniel Rubinfeld for suggestion this approach. Strictly speaking, though, the probability of being in default at the 
time of download is again only an approximation of the probability of default, or in other words, of being in default at any point 
during the bond’s life. The two concepts are equivalent only if the time spent in default does not differ systematically across 
different groups of bonds. But since the probability of default and the time spent in default are both ‘bads’, the distinction is not 
that crucial from a policy perspective.  
Table 3: Fixed effects regressions 
17 
 
At the simplest level, we may check for an association between the two dichotomous variables -
governance structure and default - by counting the number of bonds in each of the four categories and 
applying a chi-squared test. The sample for this part of the analysis comprises 554 bond issues, that is, all 
those whose governance structure is known and that have not matured yet. 17 bonds were listed as being 
in default, of which six were governed by a trust structure and eleven by a fiscal agency agreement. Of 
the 537 bonds that were not in default, 95 featured a trustee while the remaining bonds did not. Trustee-
governed bonds are evidently overrepresented among the bonds in default. A chi-squared test for 
independence yields a test statistic of 3.425. Whether one believes default status and trustee status to be 
independently distributed of each other therefore depends on the choice of confidence level: 5% vs 10%. 
Such bivariate analysis is simplistic in that the influence of other factors is not controlled for. Probit 
regression of a dummy for default status on a set of controls will produce more informative results. 
 
Dependent Variable: DEFAULT 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CONSTANT -2.734*** (0.324) -2.794*** (0.343) -4.449*** (0.742) 
DURATION 0.014** (0.007) 0.015** (0.007) 0.075*** (0.019) 
GLOBAL 0.799*** (0.309) 0.788** (0.316) 1.107* (0.589) 
PRIVATE 0.731** (0.327) 0.689** (0.323) 0.6 (0.536) 
SINKABLE 0.53* (0.283) 0.475 (0.301) 1.164*** (0.417) 
TRUSTEE 
 
0.285 (0.258) 0.851** (0.427) 
CACS 
  
-1.002*** (0.381) 
Obs. 554 554 405 
McFadden R^2 0.104 0.112 0.371 
10%-level (*), 5%-level (**) and 1%-level (***) level of significance, two-tailed test.  
 
 
 
The relatively small number of defaulted bonds means that a number of promising control variables 
cannot be used because they exhibit insufficient variation across the default and non-default categories. In 
consequence, the probit regressions, as summarised in table 4, do not fit the data particularly well. Also, 
fixed effects estimation is not an option as only four countries have bonds outstanding that are in and out 
of default, respectively. This is regrettable because this particular set of results offers the most direct 
interpretation along the lines of the research question.  
Model 1 once more includes all control variables whose coefficients are significant. The inclusion of 
the dummy for trust structures in model 2 shows that such bonds are somewhat more likely to be in 
default, but the standard error is almost as great at the coefficient itself. A distinction between English and 
New York style trustees is again not viable because of the small number of relevant cases. Model 3 adds 
the dummy for collective action clauses, with some impact on the regression output. The CACs dummy 
adds substantial explanatory power so that the goodness of fit increases to respectable levels. The 
coefficients on the existing variables also change noticeably. Remarkably, the trustee dummy coefficient 
is now significant at the five percent level, which confirms that bonds with collective enforcement appear 
more likely to be in default. The presence of collective action clauses, by contrast, significantly reduces 
default risk, as evidenced by the strong negative coefficient.  
Thus despite the comparatively poor fit of the first two models, the probit regressions actually deliver 
the strongest results on the variables of interest. The last result is a particularly interesting one because it 
suggests that collective action clauses are achieving their goal. Not even the most enthusiastic supporters 
of the clauses would claim that their inclusion in bond contracts might result in fewer defaults – the 
discussion much rather centred on the question whether defaults would increase due to CACs. Instead, 
CACs promised to enable smoother and speedier restructurings, i.e. to reduce the time a bond would 
Table 4: Probit regressions 
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spend in default. For a given default rate, the probability of being in default at any given moment should 
therefore be lower – which is what we see in the data.  
Limitations 
It has been mentioned repeatedly that all of the regression results obtained are fairly robust to 
specification changes, such as the inclusion of further variables. This is true for the control variables to a 
much greater extent than for the variables of interest, and in particular the trustee dummies. The reason is, 
as also mentioned, the small number of bonds with trustees, despite the respectable overall sample size – 
the sample of the Probit model with governance structure and CACs (model 3) includes only ten bonds in 
default. As a result, the coefficients on the trustee dummies in the various models are not very robust to 
even minor manipulations of the data. Re-coding one or two of the bonds with the largest residuals from 
‘trustee’ to ‘non-trustee’ or vice versa, or from ‘default’ to ‘non-default’ will almost always cause large 
jumps in the coefficients, and often reverse signs. Such ‘re-coding’ could easily arise unintentionally due 
to errors in the Bloomberg data or misinterpretation of those data. Furthermore, if the full set of 
information happened to be available for a different sample of bonds, different outcomes might be 
obtained even though, as we have argued, there is no systematic bias. All of this is reason to tread with 
caution when interpreting the regression results. 
5 - Conclusion  
According to an expert on market opinion, the benefits and moral hazard effects of collective enforcement 
are currently “not near the top of anyone’s mind”.23 We suggest that they should be. Collective 
enforcement’s twin topic, collective action clauses, has received much attention in academic and policy 
circles during the early 2000s. Here, the argument was made that progress on implementing the clauses 
was possible only once a sufficient body of empirical evidence had helped overcome concerns about 
increased moral hazard.  
Such evidence was so far completely lacking with respect to trustee usage. This paper is the first to 
test empirically in a cross-section setting whether individual enforcement rights, as normally found under 
a fiscal agency agreement, indeed provide a better deterrent against default than the threat of collective 
enforcement through a trustee. We began by checking for an influence of trustee usage on bond spreads, 
which may be interpreted as default risk (from the investors' perspective) or as borrowing costs (from the 
debtors'). The results indicate a slight but statistically insignificant spread premium for bonds with 
collective enforcement. With the exception of one particular specification, this also holds true when fixed 
effects are introduced as a remedy for potential endogeneity.  
Interpreting the results becomes much more intuitively appealing when we switch to probit analysis. 
The probability of being in default is slightly higher for bonds with trustees, and significantly so in what 
is arguably the best specification. Thus, reassuringly, the two different empirical approaches produce 
broadly comparable results. Incidentally, this study yields an interesting by-product to supplement the 
earlier literature on CACs: While the effects of trustee usage are generally not very strong, the presence of 
the clauses reduces spreads and the probability of being in default, respectively, in all specifications.  
The empirical analysis makes no claim to perfection. The limitations have been noted, in particular 
with respect to incomplete data and the relatively small number of bonds with pertinent characteristics. 
Firmer conclusions would require a richer data set, as may be available from Bondware, as well as more 
robust econometric techniques, for example in dealing with potential endogeneity or missing information. 
The questions addressed here deserve the same amounts of resources and expertise as were devoted to the 
                                                   
23
 Michael Chamberlin in correspondence with the author.  
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issue of collective action clauses - because trustees are an equally important component of a better 
international financial architecture. What we can say, though, is that if there were any systematic and 
pronounced relationship between issuing structure and borrowers’ incentives to default, this exploratory 
investigation would have detected it. Further research may be expected to confirm the innocuousness of 
trust structures as regards moral hazard.  
This paper has focused on issues that are similar to the ones pursued in Häseler (2008) and therefore 
the policy implications are also similar: If one believes in the benefits of trust structures, and if one 
further believes the costs of trust arrangements in terms of moral hazard to be small, which this paper has 
begun to indicate, then all necessary steps should be taken to establish the appointment of a trustee as the 
market standard, at least for medium to low rated borrowers. External pressure may be needed to 
overcome contract stickiness and prejudice in the market. Whatever mix of public sector encouragement, 
scholarly opinion, etc. worked for the proliferation of collective action clauses should be applied one 
more time. The New York Stock Exchange could follow the example of London in making the 
appointment of a trustee a requirement for listing.  
At the same time as increasing the frequency of use though, there is a need to improve the drafting 
quality of trust deeds and indentures. The trustee’s duties must be specified in such a way as to ensure its 
active role in safeguarding the bondholders’ interests and to prevent events such as the recent ones in 
Ecuador from reoccurring.  
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